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Summary 
Introduction· 
One of the major outcomes of the Local Government Reform and the Resource 
Management Law Reform has been a devolution of some resource management 
decision-making power from central government to regional and territorial 
governments. ..
The Resource Management Law Reform has also made provision for a Wide range 
of interests to be party to the decision-making process. A range of conflict 
resolution models appropriate to the circumstances of disputes are needed to assist 
in the resolution of resource management problems. The Resource Management . 
Act makes provision for alternative conflict resolution approaches within the existing 
resource consent application hearing'and appeal process. 
In the past, the adversarial model has been used to resolve resource management 
and environmental conflict problems. This approach involves. an impartial third 
party making an enforceable decision after hearing argument on the law and/or facts 
presented by the parties. This may result in a win/lose situation for. the parties . 
conce,rned where one side prevails at the end of the day.· The model requires 
disputes to be "fitted" iIi to a legal framework. Underlying concerns at the crux of 
the dispute! may not be relevant in the judicial context arid are therefore excluded 
from consideration·' by the third-party decision maker (Ministry for the 
Environment, 1988b). 
This situation has promoted a search for alternative methods of dispute resolution.,. 
Environmental mediation emerged in the United States of America in the 1970s as 
an alternative approach for the resolution of conflicts over land and environmental· 
resources, and the formulation and, implementation, of land use and environmental . 
planning policy. .. 
Environmental mediation' is a process whereby existing or potentially conflicting 
parties concerned with an environmental and/or land resource get together with a 
neutral third party to discuss their positions with regard to the resource. It involves 
bargaining, sharing of information', and ultim.ately compromising on original 
positions so as to achieve a solution 'acceptable' to all parties involved. The .final 
_ decision is iIi the hands of the parties. The outcome of mediation mayor may not . 
be an (enforceable) agreement. The aim is to achieve a 'win/win' or 'all-gain' 
outcome rather than the 'win/lose' outcome possible with the adversarial approach. 
The objective of' this' study was to investigate the circumstances under which 
resource management problems might be more appropriately resolved by mediation 
. than by judicial determination. ' ,. 
iii 
The approach adopted w~s: 
(i) prepare an overview Of environmental conflict in resource management 
decision making in New Zealand within a broad general framework, 
(ii) assess the ability of traditional judicial conflict resolution approaches to deal 
with environmental conflict, ' 
(iii) review international literature on environmental mediation, 
(iv) outline the med.iation approach to conflict resolution, 
(v) identify United States and Canadian examples of mediated conflict within the 
framework i~ (i), 
(vi) identify essential elements that increase the likelihood of 'success' in mediation. 
The problem 
The basis of contemporary environmental and resource, management conflict can 
be traced to' the emergence of 'an environmentai' p;:tradigm in the 1960s. The 
impacts of development on the 'environment began to be questioned from a number 
of quarters. Pressure on finite resources has been increasing. Maori people have 
been renewing their demands for"recognition of ,their rights to own and manage 
natural resources under, the Treaty ofWaitangi~ ,. 
The unique qualities of the environment make conflict resolution difficult. Attitudes 
towards risk and uncertainty differ and there is disagreement as to which policies 
, and values should take priority in resource management decision making, the use 
of fixed resources, and where the costs and benefits of development should fall. 
Environmental issues' that come before the courts can be categorised within three 
broad classes that correspond to specific levels of decision making (Sheppard, 1988). 
General primary issues relate to questions of national policy on whether, or not an 
activity should take place at all anywhere. These issues involve·social equity or 
philosophical questions or matters which call for value judgements. Examples 
include issues such as should natural gas be produced, for ammonia urea, synthetic 
petrol etc.; food'irradiation; the adoption of nuclear power as an energy source and 
issues over resource ownership and management' with regard to the Treaty of 
Waitangi. . 
Particular primary issues arise from. a specific proposal, with its own site and 
neighbourhood,. structures, inputs, operating methods, and impacts. Those issues 
do not uSl,Iallyraise the question of whether the proposed activity should be 
, ,permitted at all, anywhere, but whether it should be permitted at the specific site, 
with the proposed inputs, structures and methods; and usually question whether ~he 
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impaCts likely to be generated should be accepted, or at least whether they can and 
should be reduced. New Zealand examples include siting of the synthetic petrol 
plant at Motomli and the Clyde high dam. 
Secondary issues arise indirectly from a proposed activity. An example is the issue 
that. arose ab<;JUt the end-use of an aluminium smelter designed to. use electricity 
generated by a proposed power station. 
The judic~alapproach to conflict resolution has a number of important strengths. 
These include the taking of evidence under oath, and the public· nature of the 
process. Perceived limitations of the approach include a tendency towards outcomes 
that produce winners and losers, and the possibility that third party interests might 
not be represented~ The nature of the adversarial approach, encourages a focus on 
positions rather than: on the underlying concerns of tlie parties. The judiciary argue 
that they should not he required to make value judgements over general primary 
issues. They suggest that such matters are better dealt with by committees of' 
, enquiry or political decision makers who are accountable to the community. There 
is also depate as to whether the courts are the appropriate forum in which to 
resolve scientific and technical disputes. . 
The mediation approach 
The potential benefits and limitations of an alternative dispute resolution approach, 
that' of mediation, were examined. . A major benefit is that in such a voluntary 
process where the parties set the agenda themselves,' underlying concerns can be 
identified and debated. A trained 'mediator can encourage the parties to look at 
interests and not positions. . Through a process of consensus building and joint 
problem solving parties attempt to come to an agreement that is mutually 
acceptable (Bingham, 1986). 
MediatioIi processes can be designed that are appropriate to New Zealand's 
bicultural· environment. The approach is flexible in terms of participation while 
offering a degree of control to the parties' involved. It can improve relationships 
. . . 
and communications between the parties. 
Mediation doesIiot resolve the basic differenceS that separate parties in conflict nor. 
is it helpful where there are systemic grievances. Third party rights may not be 
addressed in the mediation process nor may mediated solutions be environment~lly 
sui~able or acceptable.. It can not be used to establish. a legal precedent. 
~ '
Mediation practice 
Three studies on mediation in the United States were bri~fly reviewed to gauge the 
relative success of mediation in practice. (The studies examined cases mediated' 
prior to 1985.) Mediation has been used .in cases' involving land use, natural' 
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resource management and use of public lands, water resources, energy, air quality, 
· and toxics (Ibid.). 
Measures of success can be defined in a number of ways: reaching agreement, 
implementing an agreement, improving communication, or in the process itself. 
There was little difference between parties in their success at reaching agreement 
over policy and site-specific disputes. Reaching agreement was facilitated if those 
With decision-making authority were present at the ne~otiations. 
Fewer policy. agreements were implemented than site-specific' agreements.' . The 
reasons for· this were that parties active at the national or regional level are 
generally representative of the diverse interests concerned. but not of specific 
interested parties. They'also n¢ed to gain bro~d support from the wider community. 
As mediation 'practice has matured, its success in resolving policy disputes' at the 
· (United States) federal level has improved.' " .. 
· Disputes involving cultural values in site-specific disputes h;;tve been successfully 
mediated. Scientific and technical disputes were not able to be examined within the 
time-frame available; This area needs further research. 
Litigation or mediation? 
A decision to litigate .or· mediate depends on the . particular circumstances 
surrounding 'a dispute. These include the applicable. laws and regulations, the. 
eXperiences and resources of the parties,as well as the parties' calculations of how 
well their interests would be served using a particular approach and an evaluation 
. of the po~sible' implications of going to the. bargaining table (Ibid.). 
Factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of success were discussed. They 
included party-related factors, process- and context-related factors,and .substance-
related factors., Factors crucial to the mediation process were identification of all 
affected parties, appropriate representation, incentives to medi~te, and the existing 
power balance. The number of parties involved did not appear to influence success, . 
· although mediators may have screened out disputes with a large number of potential' 
participants. The types of parties present do not appear to influence success (Ibid. ). 
Substance-related factors are important. When designing a process for a particular 
dispute the mediator encourages parties to identify the issues that are important to 
them as well as attempting to gain agreement on the scope of issues and aspects of 
the facts. of the case (Ibid.). 
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Con.clusion 
It is not possible nor proper· to . attempt to delineate a particular set of 
. circumstances when enVironmental mediation might be more appropriate in the 
. resolution of resource management problems than judicial determination;-
No empirical evidence suggests that any single type of case is inappropriate for' 
alternative dispute resolution processes., As avoluntary process, if the parties agree, 
any case can go to mediation. Because underlying substantive issues' can be 
addressed more readily using non-judicial rather than judicial approaches, many 
environmental disputes have the potential to be resolved by mediation. As the 
mediation approach is based on consensus decision making it is not' appropriate for 
situations involving deeply held, non-negotiable value positions. 
The usefulness of mediation may be influtmced more by the characteristics of a 
. particular conflict 'at a particular time than on the 'category' of the case (Ministry 
for the Environment, 1988b). The decision to litigate' or mediate is affected by the 
applicable laws and regulations, the experience of parties with alternative dispute 
resolution approaches, the resources of the parties, and how well their respective 
interests will be served by the approach in question. The likelihood of success 
depends on party-, process- and substance-r~lated factors (Bingham, 1986). 
Mediation seems to be particularly appropriate for site-specific disputes. Resource 
managers could find this, a useful tool in the resource consent application process. 
Mediation has the potential to be appropriate in disputes concerning cultural and 
spiritual values at the site-specific level. The approach may also be preferred by 
Maori people because face-to-face dialogue and conSensus' decision maldng 
.' practised on maraemore closely resemble alternative dIspute resolution approaches 
than does the judicial approach.' . 
Policy can be developed through negotiation with affected parties. However, there 
are greater difficulties involved in getting all affected parties at the negotiating table 
and in ensuring that those responsible for implementing decisions are also present. 
Mediation might resolve resource management conflict but not necessarily 
environmental problems. If there is no advocate for third party iIlt,erests, for future 
generations, or for the sustain ability of natural and physical resources, for e:?{ample, 
then the environment may be the loser. It would' be faulty to conclude . that all 
mediated settlements are necessarily just or in the public interest (Amy, 1983). . 
Recommendations 
1. A flexible, case-:-by-case approach to the use of envirpnmental mediation should 
be adopted atihis early stage. Experiments with more formal application of. the 
process in specific issue areas may be a prudent course of action. 
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- 2. Documentation and monitoring of mediatio~ efforts would allow policy and 
procedure to evolve in the light of what is' learned from practice. 
3. An investigation is required into the institutionalisation of medIation into 
resource management decision making at the resource consent application and 
appeal stages. - . 
4. Research is required on establishing the role of the neutral mediator and how 
that could be funded. A sub-set of this enquiry should be mediator ethics and 
whether a mediator should be required to represent the interests of third parties 
not represented at -negotiations. 
5. Research is required into a mediation process that is appropriate for New 
Zealand's cultural environment. ' 
6. Mediator training needs to be proVided~ This is crucial for, 'all stages of the 
process but partic~larly for pre-assessment of the dispute. . 
7. Research needs to be carried out on whether mediation might be a more 
appropriate process for resolving scientific and technical disputes. 
8. . Research would be required into the· specific nature· of policy disputes as they 
are more complicated than· site-specific disputes .. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Scope and purpose of this publication 
With provision being made. fOt: a wide range of interests and values to be party to 
decision making under the Resource Management· Act 1991 there is a need for a 
range of methods and techniques for resolving conflicts that will inevitably emerge. 
With the accompanying devolution of some resource management decision-making 
power from central government to regional and. territorialgovernrilent there will be 
. increasing pressure o~ex:istingdispute resolution institutions. 
Disputes over environmental issues are so varied; no one dispute resolution process 
can be successful in all situations. Depending on the circumstances, those involved 
may prefer to litigate, to lobby for legislative change, to seek help from an 
administrative agertcy, or to negotiate a voluntary agreement with one another 
(Bingham, 1986, xVi)~· 
Attem.pts to. resolve conflicts using judicial processes may result in a win~lose 
situation for the parties concerned. "The adversarial·model involves an impartial. 
third party. making an enforceable decision after hearing'argument on the law 
and/or facts presented by (legal representatives of) the parties" (Ministry for the 
Environm.ent, 1988b, p.5). At. the end of the day one side prevails. Both the 
process and the outcome may exacerbat~ hostilities, impede implementation, and 
foster further conflict (Ibid.). Limited financial and technical resources may' also be 
wasted (Gamman, J., Lecturer in Environmental Studies, University of California, 
pers. comm.). 
This ~ituation has promoted a search for alternative methods of dispute .resolution. 
Alternative methods, based on dialogue. and communication, have already been 
developed and applied in the areas of iabo~ur relations and family court disputes (in 
New Zealand) and international relations~ The application of these methods to 
.environmentalconflicts has been successful for several years in the. United States, 
but is still in the experimental stage in New Z"ealand .. 
The purpose o{this study is to explore the appropriateness of non-judicial means· 
of resolving resource management problems through. the mediation process. A 
conceptual framework will be developed within which further research on. an . 
appropriate model for New Zealand, its institutionalisation, mediation processes, the 
role of a neutral (mediator), etc. can be carried out. 
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1.2 What is environmental dispute resolution? 
One of the major assumptions inherent in alternative environmental dispute 
resolution approaches is that the parties involved are the best judges of ~hat the 
real issues are and whether an adequate resolution has been achieved. In theory 
these approaches allow broader attention to the real issues because the parties 
themselves set the agenda and they also decide the terms of the agreement 
(Bingham, 1986, p.xx). It should, be noted, however, that all affected parties must 
be involved for· this assumption to be valid .. 
'Private dispute resolution, as contrasted to the public court system, is 
the consensual attempt by' disputing parties to resolve their. ~onflict 
outside of the public system... Rules of procedure, the binding or non-
binding. nature of the result, the role, if any, of the law, and other 
.designed features are subject to the mutual agreement or acceptance of 
the parties to the dispute" (Johnston, .1989, p.2). 
Environmental mediation has been emerging since the 1970s "as an alternative 
approach for (1) the resolution of conflicts over land and environmental resources, 
and (2) the formulation and implementation of land use and environmental planning 
policy ... Environmental mediation is a process whereby existing or potentially 
conflicting parties concerned. with an. environmental and/or land resource get 
together. with a neutral third party to discuss their positions with regard to the 
resource. It irivolvesbargaining, sharing 'of inforinfltion, and ultimately 
. " 
compromising on. original positions so as' to achieve a solution 'acceptable' .. to all 
parties involved" (Jacobs and Rubino, 1987, p.1). 
Documented experience gained in the United States over the past decade highlights 
the range of resource use conflicts that can be addressed using the mediation 
technique. It has been used in cases involving land use, natural reSource 
management, water resources, energy, air quality and toxics (Bingham, 1986, 
pp.32-33). " 
'Success' in mediating resource use conflict can be defined or' measured in a number 
of different ways: whether agreement has been reacheQ, the ~xtent to which the" 
agreement is supported by the parties through implerp.entation, or even whether 
communications between the parties improved through the process (Bingham, 1984, 
pp.65-89). In order to increase the likelihood of success, certain crucial.factors must 
hold. These include the' voluntary nature of the process; whether" incentives exist 
for parties to mediate, representation of all affected parties at the mediati<)fl table, 
awareness of power" balances, and the' likelihood of implementation of any 
agreement· reached (Jeffery," 1988; Bingham, 1984; Ministry for the 
. Environment, 1988b). 
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1.3 Objective 
To 'identify the circumstances under which resource management problems might 
. be more appropriately resolved by mediation than by judicial determination. 
lA Approach 
. . (i). Overview of environmental conflict in resource management decision making . 
in New Zealand within a broad general fra~ework. 
(ii)· Assess the ability of traditional judicial contlict resolution approaches to deal 
with environmental conflict. 
(iii) Review international literature on environmental mediation. 
(iv) Outline the mediation approach to conflict resolution. 
(v) Identify United States and Canadian examples of mediated conflict within 
the framework in (i). . 
(vi) Identify essential elements. that increase the likelihood of 'success' in 
mediation. 
1.S Summary 
In Chapter 2 the fundamental nature of New Zealand's environmenialproblem, that .. 
is, competing claims for natural resources is outlined. Three broad classes of 
envirorimental issues will he discussed. The judicial approach will be examined to 
consider how appropriate iUs in resolving resource management and environmental 
cOllfiict. . 
The following chapter will look at potential benefits and limitations of an alternative 
approach to contlict resolution, that of environmental mediation. 
Chapter 4 gives a general review of mediation practice in North America.· 
References to 'calling in a neutral mediator' relate to the North American situatIon 
where mediation has been institutionalised. However, it should be noted that the. 
New Zealand context is different to that of the United States of America where 
courts and Judges are cpnfined to determining questions of law. Judges there are 
. not specialists in environmental law and· do. not sit with expert members of the 
courts. In NewiZealand, Planning Tribunal Judges are experienced in matters of 
3 
environmental law and are able to call upon experts to provide specialised 
knowledge. 
In Chapler 5 the factors that influence a party's decision to choose litigation or 
mediation are identified; 
In the final chapter the circumstances under which resourc.e management problems 
. might be more appropriately resolved by mediation than by judicial determination 
are discussed. 
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CHAPTER·2 
Nature of the problem 
2.1 ,Derivation of ~nvironmental.and resourcemanageme~t conOict 
Until recent times, economic development. has been r(!garded by many as the 
corJ)erstone of social progress. It' Was "the means by which the lives of all members 
of society would constantly improve'" (Bacowand Wheeler, 1984, p.1). Although 
there has always be~n a'degree of awareness of sQ):ne of the negative consequences .' 
of .economic development, people's attitudes about them have begun to change. 
The emergence of new political movements in the 1960s and: '70s demonstrated a 
fundamental change in social values. This shift in public opinion is also reflected 
iJi the growth of political and legal institutions· that ,are concerned with 
environmental protection (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984, pp.1-2). 
In New Zealand proposals were being made in the 1960s to raise the level of Lake 
Manapouri in order to provide generating head for potential hydro electric power 
schemes. Lobby groups such as "Save Manapouri Campaign", "Clutha Rescue" and 
"Coalition for Open Government" emerged to protest·the lack·ofrecognition being 
given to' environmental values. 
In addition, " ... a dramatic advance has occurred (in the last decade) in both statute 
, law and case decisions concerning the recognition of Maori rights, as provided for 
in the TreatyofWaitangi ... (A)n important legal renaissance is occurring in relation 
to the, recognition of Maori rights and values· ... " (Palmer, 1987, pp.27,.28). 
I~creasing 'pressure, on finit~ resources' from a varying. range of potential users ... 
contributes to resource management problems and environmental conflict. 
2.2' Causes of environmental con~ict .' 
'The complex nature of the natural environment and our lack of precise scientific 
information causes problems in identifying the causal factors of environmental 
degradation. Because it js difficult to establish links' between cause and effect we 
are not able to predict accurately the outcomes of our actions. Science can 'explain' . 
some phenomena but there is no common agreement amongst the 'experts' as to 
the proper course of action. ' 
, 
The unique qualities of the environment makes conflict resolution difficult. Features 
of their complex nature include. the irreversibility of some impacts, indeterminate 
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time-horizons, where the costs might fall; problems in identifying the 'public interest 
(Susskind and Weinstein, '1980, pp.311-357), uncertainty, differing ass~ssments of 
probabilities," differing attitudes towards risk and the fact that impacts are not 
necessarily restricted to national boundaries (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984, pp.7-9). 
Cultural differences 'can !Dean that water that ~s clean by quality. classification 
, standards under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 may not be dean by 
Maori spiritual standards. 
"When we' talk about what individuals, groups, orgimizations and 
interests are presently involved in the controversy - we frequently find that 
,almost invariably' the reasons people propose projects are,technical, and 
economic, and the rea,son people oppose projects are social, (cultural) 
and environmental. The proponents continue to g~nerate technical 
information which' does not answer the (social or environmental) 
concerns of the opponents;' (Huser, 1982, p.24). 
Suilivan 0984, p.16) suggests four major sources of conflict that arise in relation to 
a development project. (The scheme is based on the work of Susskind et al., 1978). 
-, 
" 1. Disagreement, over (he relevant weights granted to 
competing policies and values 
2. DiSagreements over the new distribution of costs and 
benefits thatarisefrom a project 
3. Disagreements over the appropriate,level of protection f;om 
environmental and health harms 
4. Disagreements over the use of fixed resources". 
2.3 Categorising environmental issues 
Before examining the proposition that the judicial approach may not always be the 
most appropriate for dealing with environmental conflict, ih is useful to briefly 
examine the $kinds of 'issues ,that come before the courts. . 
A,general classification qf environmental issues that represent the different levels 
of decision making involved in the allocation and use of natural resources will be 
USed. Sheppard (1988, pp.1-2) proposes three broad classes: general primary issues, 
particular primary issues, and secondary issues. 
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"General primary issues are not bound to a particular proposal, although 
controversy about them may be stimulated by· particular proposals. 
Rather, general issues question whether a particular activity should be 
permitted at all, anywhere" (Sheppard, 1988, p.l). 
'Particular primary issues arise from a specific proposal, with its own site 
. and neighbourhood, structures, inputs, operating methods, and impacts" 
(Ibid.). 
i'Secondary issues are about effects·which do not directly and obviously 
result from the proposed activity, but which occur as a consequence of 
it" (IbuL p.3) .. 
General primary issues are based on social equity or philosophical issues,· or matters 
that call for what are essentially value judgements (Ibid. p;10)~ Fundamental 
. resource management issues that are addressed at the national policy level fall into 
this category. (For a discussion on national policy matters in resource manageinent, 
seethe paper prepared by KarenCronin in (Ministry for the Environment, 198&)) . 
. "Examples from New Zealand's experience over the last decade are: Whether 
natural gas should be used to produce ammonia urea, methanol, or synthetic petrol; 
(and) whether articles, and food in particular, should'be sterilised by irradiation" . 
(Sheppard, 1988 p.1); the debate over whether nuclear power is a viable or socially 
, acceptable energy alternative for New Zealand, and whether the Treaty of Waitangi 
, should be taken in~o· account in decision making. 
Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, pp.18-19) refer to disputes around such issues as 
constitutional disputes; they hinge primarily on interpretations by the courts of 
rights guaranteed under. the (United States) Constitution. "New Zealand .has no 
written constitution - no set of principles against which legislation is judged and 
struck down if it. does not conform with the principles ... The basic legal rule of our 
. constitution is that parliament is supreme. When it passes'legislation that is the 
law" (Palmer, 1979, p.1l0). In other words, decisions over general primary issues 
are. made by Parliament. 
Particular primary issues "do not usuall~ raise the question whether the proposed 
activity should be permitted at all, anywhere, but whether it should be permitted at 
the specific site, with the proposed inputs, structures and methods; and usually 
question whether the impacts likely to be generated should be. accepted, or at least 
whether they can and should be reduced" (Sheppard, 1998, p.1). New Zealand 
examples include siting of the synthetic petrol plant at Motonui and the Clyde high 
dam. Such issues are generally addressed in the resource consent-granting process. 
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Susskind and Cruikshank (1987, pp.17-20) refer to such public disputes as 
distributi()nal disputes. "Distributional disputes focus on the allocation of funds, the 
setting of standards, or the siting of facilities (including how we use our land and 
water),'. United States examples include the' reallocation of water rights, the' 
closing of the Three Mile Island nuclear power plant in Pennsylvania, battles over 
Native American fishing rights in the Great Lakes, and various efforts to combat 
acid rain. 
These site-specific disputes can involve scientific and technical issues related to 
activities such as mining, for example, or the local recognition of matters of national 
significance. Small-scale, low impact developmerits also fall into this category. 
Decision making is generally at. the regional or local district level. 
The distinction between these two categories of dispute is not always clear. 
Challenges to the'. exercise of governmental authority can arise at the point where 
a development project is being proposed. If the fundamental philosophical issue has 
not been previously debated it will have to be resolved before the site-specific issues 
can be addressed. 
Inthe early stages ofa controversial policy issue there may be disagreement over 
the nature of the problem and whether a problem exists at all (Bingham, 1986, 
. p.77). The planning for the Clyde high dam provides a useful example. A number 
of those opposing the dam believed there was insufficient demand for end use of 
the electricity to be generated. 
Secondary issues can include indirect social impacts of an activity, or additive effects 
such as incremental pollution. A synergism may occur where one impact may 
aggravate the effect of another. Secondary effects of a proposal are not always easy 
to identify in advance. nor can their future effects always be quantified 
(Sheppard, 1988, p.3). A local example of secondary issues is that " ... which arose 
about iheend-use for an aluminium smelter of electricity which would be generated 
by a proposed power station" (Sheppard, 1988, p.2). 
2.4 The judicial approach to conflict resolution . 
2.4.1 . The Planning Tribunal 
When giving wide planning powers to Councils, Parliament created procedures in . 
order to protect the rights of land owners. " ... (P)ersons and bodies (can) object to 
proposed planning schemes, or special applications and obtain a review (of Council 
decisions) by a judicial body" (Williams, 1985, pA). Decisions made by city and 
territorial authorities (councils and regional water boards, for example), N.W.S.C.A., 
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etc: on how resources are to be allocated and used can be appealed to the .Planning 
Tribunal which has all the powers of the District Court. 
The Planning Tribunal' consists of a maximum of five District Court Judges (each 
of whom is a Planning Judge) .and not more than 10 other persons. The presence 
of at least two members of the Tribunal (of whom a Planning Judge or alternate 
Planning Judge is one) is necessary to constitute a sitting of the Tribunal (Town and 
Country Planning Act, 1977, s.134). Persons with specialised knowledge or interest 
, connected with the functions of the Planning Tribunal . may be appointed, 
(Ibid., s.131). Evidenc~, whether legally admissible or not, may be called in 
(Ibid.,s.149). Therl::l,nning Tribunal's function is not confined to legal issues but 
extends to. deciding environmental issues on their merits. A Planning Tribumil 
decision can be the subject of an appeal (limited to questions of law) to the High 
, Court, and the High Court's judgement can, with leave, be appealed to the Court 
of AppeaL 
The broad responsibility for the establishment of policy and th~ determination of ' 
works priorities lies with central and local government. The Planning Tribunal can 
consider a matter within the light of wider issues of Government or Council policies 
(Williams, 1985, p.6). 
tithe adversary system is used in Tribunal hearings to resolve District, 
Scheme matters. It resembles a contest where opposing parties call 
(usually) expert witnesses to provide evidence, both fact and opinion. 
Legal advocates'endeavour to 'build up' their client's ease and 'break 
, down' that of their opponents by examination, cross examination and re-
examination of witnesses and by legal submissions", 
(Williams, 1985, p.6). 
In Williams', (Ibid.) view, the immense advantage of this approach to conflict 
·resolution is "that evidence is taken on oath and tested by cross examination. This 
generally results in thorough preparation and ensures a high level of integrity". A' 
second important'feature of the approach is the public nature with which hearings 
are carried out apart from certain specified circumstances. 
24.2 Limitations of the advers~rial approach 
. The adversarial approach tends to focus on the positions ,of the parties; the problem 
therefore appears to be a conflict of positions. Bargaining or negotiating over 
positions locks the parties into their positions; they defend them against attack and 
become involved in 'face-saving' strategies. "As more attention is paid to positions, 
less attention is devoted to meeting the underlying concerns or interests of the 
parties" (Fisher and Ury, 1981, p.5). . 
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Because the approach requires disputes to be 'fitted' into a legal framework 
"(c)oncerns that 'really matter' to those affected by the decision of the ·court. or 
tribunal may not be legally relevant and may necessarily be excluded· from 
consideration by the decision-maker" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p;5). 
As stated in the previous chapter, attempts to resolve conflict using. judicial 
. processes may result in a 'win/lose' situation for the parties concerned. "The 
adversarial model involves an impartial third party making an enforceable decision 
after hearing argument on the law and/or facts presented by (legal representatives 
of) the parties" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.5). At the end of the day 
one side prevails. The .model does not· offer opportunities for compromise that 
could result in gains and losses for both sides. 
A further limitation of the adversarial approach is raised by Judge Sheppard. "Most 
. . 
judges' experience is in a tradition of limited a~cess to information, and the 
constraints of the adversary process. They tend to focus on. the particular issue in 
hand, and the interests of -the parties before them. However a decision on an 
environmental issue will almost always' affect" other people and other cases. A 
tendency to focus on the case in hand may hinder a judge from considering public 
values and interests which are not represented by the parties to the particular 
dispute. The parties cannot be relied on to draw attention to all relevant 
information" (Sheppard, 1988, p.13). 
Some people have expressed the view (Ministry for the Environment, 1989, p.29) 
that the courts are not the most appropriate forum for resolving scientific. and 
technical disputes, despite the opportunities available under the Resource 
Management Act 1991 for expert evidence to be presented. to the Planning 
Tribunal. Part of the problem stems from the scale and complexity of the. issues 
involved. It is difficult for the courts to evahIate the trade-offs in situations 
involving a high degree of uncertainty. "Disagreements exist about the magnitude 
of risk, the appropriateness of measuring techniques, and the reliability of data" 
(Jasonoff and Nelkin, 1987, p.61).· . 
Although it is not possible to examine this issue within the scope of this publication, 
it is an area worthy of further research. It is noted that theRe~ource Management 
Act provides for. a greater mix of knowledge and experience amongst members 
(commissioners and deputy commissioners) of the Planning Tribunal than has been 
provided for in the past. This mayor may not address for the difficulties associated 
with resolving scientific and technical disputes. 
Disputes over resource management and environmental issues sometimes place the 
courts. in' a difficult position when they are expected to make what are commonly 
referred to as value judgements. The following concerns relate to general primary 
issues involving fundamental resource management policy decisions. 
"The (Planning) Tribunal is charged with interpreting legislation and the 
provisions of planning schemes and management plans which are 
sometimes very generally expressed. The various Acts give little specific 
direction on the criteria to be used by the Tribunal in its determinations. 
For example, matters stated in Section 3 of the Town and Country 
Planning Actt as being of 'national importance', are a series of very. 
broad guidelines for the preparation and determination of policy related 
to planning $chemes. Some are so general that they are not capable of 
interpretation in specific situations~Furthermore, .in practice the 
. guidelines may conflict with one another... The Tribunal has repeatedly 
emphasised that its role is not policy making but interpretation and the 
resolution of conflict" (Williams, 1985, pp.5-6) .. 
Judge A.R. Turner (McBride, 1986) asks: "Is it appropriate that the.Courts and 
other judicial bodies . should become. involved in the resolution' of policy issues: Is 
that a proper role for a judicial body? How can the Courts persuade the 
community that a course of action not obviously beneficial will have the most 
beneficial long term effects: Should the Courts have the authority to make decisions 
which impose costs on the community when they are not directly answerable to nor 
elected by the community." 
Principal Planning Judge Speppard gives his view. "Where questions of social 
. equity, philosophical issues, or ~atters which call for what are essentially value 
judgement predominate, they cannot be satisfactorily made by a rational process 
. following objective evaluation and sifting of the evidence. . They are really policy 
decisions which ought to' be made by a body which is politically responsible" 
. (Sheppard, 1988, p.l0).- "Determination of policy on (such) broad; general iss,~es is 
not an appropriate function for the' judiciary because of a lack of Judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving them, and because it is likely 
to draw the judiciary into controversy with the politicians. That could undermine 
public conference (sic) in the independence of the judiciary" (Ibid., p.2). 
A final issue that is not a limitation of the approach discussed above but rather one 
that may emerge under the Resource Management Act is that the devolution of 
decision-making power from central government to regional and local government 
will probably result' in an increased number of cases coming before the Planning 
Tribunal. Substantial time delays' could be expected, particularly as the resources 
of the Tribunal have not been significantly' increased· under the Act. Alternative 
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dispute resolution approaches could therefore be in greater demand than they have 
in the past. 
2.S Summary 
This chapter briefly examined the causes of resource management and. 
environmental conflict. Some of those identified include differing attitudes towards 
risk and uncertainty, indeterminate time-horizons, cultural values, as well as 
disagreements over the distribution of costs and benefits, the use of fixed resources, 
appropriate levels of protection from environmental and health harms, and the 
relevant weights granted to competing policies and values. 
Environmental issues that come before the courts were Viewed within three broad 
categories; general primary issues, particular primary issues, and secom;lary issues. 
These issues relate to different levels of resource management decision making. 
The judicial model of environmental dispute resolution in New Zealand was briefly 
e~amined.. A major advantage is that a high levelofintegrity is maintained through 
the taking of evidence under oath· and the cross-examination of witnesses~ 
A number of possible limitations to the adversarial approach were highlighted. The 
judiciary is responsible for ensuring that the will of the legislature is fairly and justly . 
interpreted. Such decisions, however, tend to result in a win-lose situation for the . 
parties ,involved.· In addition, underlying interests of the parties. might :not be 
relevant in a judicial situation. A further concern is that third party jnterests may 
not be represented in the proceedings. 
Finally, some members of the judiciary have expressed concern th~t they are 
required to resolve what are basically fundamental resource management policy 
issues .. They are not assisted by vague legislative requirements. . 
In the next chapter an alternative model of dispute resolution, that of mediation, 
will be examined to see whether it has the potential to address the problems . 
outlined above in a more satisfactory way. 
12. 
CHAPTER 3 
The mediation approach 
3.1 . Alternative dispute resolution approaches 
\ 
Environmental dispute resolution is the collective term that refers to '~a variety of 
approaches that· allow the parties to meet face to face to reach a mutually 
acceptable resolution of the issues in a dispute or potentially controversial situation" 
(Bingham, 1984, p.iv). The processes are voluntary and all involve some form of 
consensus building, joint problem solving or negotiation. 
One of the major assumptions inherent· in. environmental dispute resolution 
. alternatives is that the parties involved are the best judges of what the real issues 
are and whether an adequate resolution has been achieved. In theory such 
processes allow broader attention to the real issues because the parties themselves 
set the agenda and they also decide the terms of the agreement (Ibid~, p.70). They 
are free to discuss the concerns that are of most importance to them; concerns that 
may not be relevant'in the courtroom or tribunal situation but are relevant within 
these alternative processes. 
It is in the interests of all parties to the dispute :that all those .who believe they 
might be affected by a decision should participate; a party that has been excluded 
has the potential to undermine the implementation of any agreement reached. 
Johnston (1989, p.2) describes these approaches in the United States context. 
"Private . dispute resolution, as contrasted to· the public court system, is the 
consensual attempt by disputing parties to resolve their conflict outside of the public 
. system ... Rules of procedure, the binding or non-binding nature of the result,the 
role, if any, of the law, and other designed features are subject to the mutual 
agreement or acceptance of the parties to the dispute". The consensual nature of 
this approach implies re·cognition of the legitimacy of the demands of other parties 
and of the parties themselves (Bacow and Wheeler, 1984, p.53). 
Many of the references in this report derive from the North American experience 
which has tended to view these approaches as alternative to the judicial process. 
However, the proposed Resource Management Act (clauses 85 and 315) contains 
enabling provisions for mediation, facilitation, etc. to be used in a voluntary manner 
as a supplement to or extension of the resource consent hearing and appeal process. 
The intention is to provide opportunities for reducing or potentially avoiding 
unnecessary litig~tion. 
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3.2 Mediation 
The process of mediation should be distinguished from those of negotiation and 
bargaining. Negotiation is a process similar to mediation but it occurs without the 
use of a neutral third party mediator. Bargaining is the least formal of the three 
processes and is a component of the negotiation and mediation processes '(Jacobs 
and Rubino, 1987, pp.1-2). Appendix I provides a brief outline of the phases of the 
mediation process and the tasks performed by the mediator at each phase. 
Mediation can be an informal ad hoc policy-making process where representatives 
from environmental and business groups sit down together with local government 
officials to negotiate policies· to resolve a particular. environmental dispute (Amy, 
1983, p.346). The process can also be quite formal through the use of an 
institutionalised service, or more structured processes for intervention and/or dispute 
handling (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.3). 
Parties to a dispute may have reached an impasse and seek a neutral to help them 
break the deadlock. The mediator will usually perform an assessment of how 
amenable the particular dispute might be to mediation; the criteria on which this . 
is based is discussed in Chapter 5.2. The neutral mediator facilitates negotiations . 
but has no power to impose a settlement .. The settlement is determined by the 
mediating parties. 
3.3 Potential benefits ot mediating environmental conflict . 
The adversarial approach tends to focus on the positions ~fthe parties rather than 
on their underlying interests or concerns. Fisher and Ury (1981, p.43) argue that 
. the basic problem in a negotiation lies in the conflict between .each side's needs, 
desires, concerns, and·· fears, and not in conflicting positions. By focusing on . 
interests, underlying, values held by each of the parties can be articulated and a 
s01ution consistent with these values can be sought. A skilful mediator .will assist the 
disputants to explore the range of needs and concerns of· all parties and then to 
. reframe or reconceptualise issues to move away from polarised positions (Ministry 
. for the Environment, 1988b, p.6). 
Mediation encourages a search for shared and compatIble interests behind opposed 
positions and not just conflicting ones. Instead of a winllose outcome, parties look 
to a win/win or all-gain situation where compromise on original positions me.ans 
there are no outright winners or losers. 
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One of the major arguments in favour of negoti~tion and· mediation of 
environmental disputes is that underlying interests can be addressed. Whatever 
. issues are of concern to the parties are relevant to mediation of the dispute 
· (Ministry for Environment, 1988b, p.6). If underlying concerns are addressed, any 
final agreement has the potential· to be implemente4 with the support of the parties 
concerned and the conflict subsequently resolved. 
Mediation provides an approach that may be appropriate to NewZealand's cultural 
environment. (It is also consistent with the provisions in the Resource Management 
Act for Tikaka Maori to be recognised at ·Planning Tribunal hearings.) Scientific 
and technical soluti9ns emanating from one cultural view may have little relevance 
to that of another. Alternative dispute resolution processes provide a fotum where 
cultural and spiritual Values can be discussed and consensus agreements adopted 
that take these values into account. 
" .. , ' , '. , ..... 
· The advantage of mediation is that where a disl?ut~ jnyolvesQ1&ttels· of a cQltur~ 
interest, processes can be developed that are sensitive to cultural norms .. Thjs could 
include co.;mediators of sufficient 'mana to provide· legitimacy and credibility to the 
process (MinIstry for the Environment, 1988b, p.32). Greater support for any final 
agreement could be expected from those to whom ·this i~sue is significant. 
The face-to-face dialogue that is an integral part of the mediation process mirrors 
the traditional Maori decision-making process (Gray, Director, Centre for Maori 
Studies and Research, Lincoln University, pers. comm.). The principle of 
kotahitaka, that is, Maori political process, "is directed· towards the necessity of· 
. reaching unity through consensus (sic) .,. Maaori .political process is designed· to 
recognise individuals and include all their concerns even if in the end they do nQt. 
· get their own way" (Ritchie, 1986, p.30). Consensus decision making allows people 
to participate in their own destiny (Gray, pers. comm.). 
Mediation is sufficiently flexible to allow all those who might be affected by the 
outcome of decision making to participate. in the process (Ministry for the 
Environment, 1988b, p.6). Participation is . particularly. important when an 
agreem·ent is being implemented. If anyone who might be able to undermine 
implementation is not present during negotiations, the agreement will probably fail. 
"Applications for consents which have high impacts on a community or 
locality (e.g. siting of an LPG facility, a mining·operation)~ Qr which 
require some co-operation from affected parties e.g. water rights, would 
. seem to lend themselves to full-scale participation of community and 
environmental groups ... " within the mediation process (Ministry for the 
Environment, 1988b, p.10). 
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One major attribute of non-judicial processes not available to j~dicial processes may. 
encourage parties to seek mediation, and that is control. "Parties ... gain greater 
control over timing of events, selection of neutral ( sic), processes used, discovery ... 
(and) outcome" (Johnston, 1989, p.4). This might be an attractive feature to those 
parties who feel they are relatively powerless in a judicial setting. -. 
Flexibility of process is related to the notion of controL Parties can design a process 
that is appropriate for Jheir particular needs. The parties are likely to be more 
committed to the outcome if it is 'theirs' than if it had been imposed upon them by 
a third party decision-maker, (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.6). 
Mediation can improve communications between the parties. It "seeks to educate. 
disputants about each other's perceptions and concerns. This can significantly 
improve relationships between disputants even where no agreement is reached" 
(Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.6). Subsequent encounters are less likely 
to be confrontational if parties .have met face-fo-face and shared their concerns 
(Bacow and .Wheeler (pp.18-19) .. 
Proponents of environmental mediation see it as a suppiement and sometimes as 
a substitute for unsatisfactory ·methods of public policy administration and 
implementation particularly at local government level. They believe that the public 
policy resulting from mediation efforts is clearer and more responsive to those 
interests concerned with that policy (Jacobs and Rubino, 1987, p.2). 
. . 
"Mediation has proved a valuable process in negotiating the principles < 
and standqrds to be applied- in relation to how a development is to 
proceed in a particular community, e.g. waste management facilities. 
The process can be assisted by having a frarnework of broad national 
principles/standards, but enables.the detail of how those principles will 
apply to be fashioned in the light of the circumstances and needs of the 
individual community" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.l0). 
A· submission by K.R.T.A. Ltd in response to People, environment and decision 
making (Ministry for the Environment, 1989, p.29) favoured a non:·adversarial 
approach for technically complicated resource development projects such as gold 
and coal mining. "For t~ese projects, decisions based on the technical information 
should, in most cases, be better than those influenced by legal manipulation in a 
court-room situation". 
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3.4 Limitations of mediation 
According to Talbot (1983, pp.93-94) "the chances that a dispute can be l11ediated 
are reduced when the resolution of a larger policy question is at stake (or)when the 
fundamental interests of the parties are mutually exclusive ... ". He cites an example 
of where nuclear power plants' may be opposed by groups;· not because there is 
opposition to a particular site, but because they are basically against nuclear power. 
"They are em1;>racing the particular dispute as part of a larger ideological agenda 
that they would be unwilling to sacrifice in mediation". 
Mediation results in~ trade-offs and compromises 'being made. Some argue that on 
issues of basic vahles no substantive compromise is possible (Jacobs and Rubino, 
1987, p.2). Some disputes are therefore amenable only to win-lose approaches 
(Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.7). "Ifthere are philosophical differences, 
perhaps mediation is inappropriate" (Husar, 1982, p.23). " ... (E)nvironmental 
disputes occasionally involve nonnegotiable items. In such cases, unless the issues 
can be' redefined, mediation may not be .the best way to settle the dispute" 
(Bingham, 1984; p.163). 
''Mediation does not lead to' a resolution of the basic differences that 
separate the parties in conflict. Rather, in situations where none of the 
parties perceives that it is able to gain its goals unilaterally, mediation 
can help the parties agree on how to make the accommodations that 
will enable them to co-exist despite their continued differences" 
. (Cormick, 1987, p.3(7) . 
. "Because it (mediation) is ,a process which seeks accommodation 
individual (sic) disputes, mediation in (sic) not helpful where there are 
systemic grievances. Where a dispute concerns the underlying legality of 
conduct, e.g., the need may be to identify or to reinforce the particular 
standard which should prevail. This need may relate to a lack of 
certainty where many groups are. affected; and/or to the relative power 
between. groups in the absence of an enforceable and predictable 
standard. Courts play a vital role in fashioning norms and articulating 
values for the wider society . in the form of legal principles which operate 
as precedents for future, like. cases... This work of the adversary system 
may be more appropriate in particular cases than mediation. It also 
often forms an essential part of the framework for useful mediation (and 
negotiation)" (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.7). 
17 
"Negotiations are not so likely to lead to a sound and satisfying 
conclusion where negative externality effects are spread thinly and wisely, 
so that those affected are not in practice able to take full part in the 
negotiation process. If no one chooses to represent the needs of future 
generations, or the intrinsic value of ecosystems and the sustainability of 
resources, those values could be neglected in a negotiation process" 
(Sheppard, 1988, P712). 
In his review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, Anthony Hearn, Q.c. 
(1987, p.103) highlights a further potential difficulty with the mediation ~odd in 
terms of third party rights or -those of the communIty at large in planning matters. 
Althoughparties may come to an agreement there is no certainty that the Planning 
Tribunal would find the flgreement acceptable .. All matters have to be considered 
in relation to the statutory regime within which' the parties are working. 
Mediation, therefore, cannot serve as an alternative approach to the judicial process' 
. in terms of the New Zealand resource management/planningsystem. The onus of 
any resource consent decision must always lie with the consent authority or the 
Planning Tribunal because of the policy element and third party interests inherent 
in environmental disputes. 
Certain issues of principle or law are not appropriate for mediation .• "If some party 
wants to set a legal precedent, mediation is not the way to go" (Husar? 1982, p.23). 
The oft-quoted Huakina case (1987) provides a useful illustration of this point. 
After a -number of wrangles in the courts dating from 1981, the Huakina 
Development Trust finally received recognition of their concerns, namely, that 
Maori cultural and spiritual vahies are relevant to water right applications. Justice 
Chilwell's findings not only applied to the site-specific case on the .Waikato River, 
but also served to act as a national precedent. His decision haq a far-reaching 
effect that mediation could not have achieved. 
Mediation would seem inappropriate in cases involving prosecution. for an offence. 
The approach does not embody the procedural safeguards of the adversary system 
such as protection against self-incrimination (Ministry for the Environment, 
1988b, p.7). 
"Mediation is not . helpful where key parties are effectively 'conflict 
junkies'; or the dispute is seen as a heroic battle; or where the conflict 
is infected by extreme irrationality or irremediable power imbalances" 
(Ibid.). 
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The question of privacy is one that should be considered in the mamigement -of 
public resources. Unless there is a statutory _ requirement that negotiations be 
publicly announced or that the details of any outcome be ma<,ie public, mediation 
is generally a private affair involving only the mediator and the parties to the 
dispute. . 
3.5 Summary 
Environmental mediation is a voluntary dispute r~solution approach that is based 
on consensus-building, face.;.to-face dialogue between parties in conflict. Because it 
encourages consideration of the underlying issues at the heart of the conflict and 
parties are in control of the process, mediation has the potential to address some· 
of the limitations of traditional decision-making processes. If the interests and 
concerns, rather than the positions, of the parties are addressed the problem has the 
potential to be resolved. This may reduce the need to turn or return to expensive, 
lengthy court hearings to try and gain resolution. Consensus facilitates an 'all-gain' 
outcome whereas the judicial approach often produces a 'win/lose' decision. 
Further potential benefits of the mediation approach include its appropriateness 
within New Zealand's cultural environment and the flexibility it offers in terms of 
participation. Channels of communication can be opened and relationships 
improved between parties. Of particular importance with regard to the proposed 
Resource Management Act is that the mediation approach is to be employed as a 
supplement or adjunct to existing resource consent hearing and appeal processes. 
Those familiar with the Planning Tribunal system would recognise that some of th~ 
potential benefits of mediation are also features of local authority and Planning 
Tribunal hearings. It is very important that alternative processes maintain these 
positive features. . 
However, there appears to be a mim~er of limitations to its success. Non-negotiable 
items involving philosophical positions can not be resolved using the consensus 
approach unless the issues can be redefined. Mediation is not helpful where there 
are systemic grievances or where parties may wish to set precedents. There can be 
no guarantee that third party rights or, for example, the interests of future 
generation~ wIll be represented in negotiations. This was also expressed as a 
limitation of the judicial-approach. 
The issue of privacy needs to be considered.in the management of public resources. 
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In the next chapter mediation in practice will be examined in order to gauge its 
success to date in resolving resource management and environmental disputes. It 
will be of interest to see whether mediation can address the other limitations of the 
judicial approach identified in Chapter 2. These were the issues raised by the 
. judiciary of resolving national policy issues at the site-specific level, and the 
'resolution of scientific and technical disputes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Mediation practice 
.4.1 Introduc;tion 
. . 
This chapter will look at mediation practice to see the kind of disputes that have 
been mediated and the features that denote success. We shall be interested in 
whether mediation might be appropriate in a bicultural environment, and whether 
it can resolve n~tiorial.policy issues and scientific and technical disputes. 
4.2' What kind .of disputes have been mediated? 
In the main, environmental dispute resolution processes have been used on an 
ad hoc, case-by-case basis (Bingham, 1986, p.xix; Ministry for the Environment, 
1988b, p.12). 
HOver the past 15-20 years, mediation has.been used, with varying 
success, in disputes over water use, mining, siting of nuclear power plants . 
. and hazardous waste facilities, dam construction, routing of highways, 
flood protection, native fishing rights, licensing under. Clean Air 
legislation, and mle.:-making under a variety of statutes" (Ministry for 
the Environment, 1988b, p.2)~ 
In North America, a diverse range of disputes (in terms of complexity, context etc.) 
has been brought to mediation. 
Three studies of .environmental mediation will be briefly reviewed. Bingham's 
(1986) study involves 160-plus cases covering both policy (general primary issues) 
and .site-specific" (particular primary issues) disputes, Talbot (1983) reviews six site-
,specific cases, and the Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986) study is based upon 81 
site-specific. cases. The number of cases common to all three studies is unknown; 
however, three of Talbot's cases are included in Bingham's revi(;!w. . 
The 160-plus cases mediated during the decade 1973/4-1984 reviewed by Bingham 
(1986, pp.32-33) fall into six broad categories: land use (approx. 86 cases), natural 
resource management and use of public lands (31 cases), water resources (17 cases), 
energy (13 cases), ~ir quality (13 cases), and toxies (16 cases). Of these cases 115 
involved (particular primary) site-specific disputes, and 46 involved issues of (general 
primary) environmenuil policy (Ibid., 1986, p.7), 
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In Settltng things, Talbot documents six site-specific' disputes that were settled by 
mediation with varying degrees of success. Those whQ served as mediators in these . 
cases generally agreed that about 10% of environmental disputes can be successfully 
mediated (Talbot, 19~3, p.91). 
Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986, p.55) describe the outcome of a study they 
conducted in 1983 of 81 site-specific cases were mediators became i:pvolved. The 
cases ranged from small-scale disputes (such as the location of a small parking lot) 
to major environmental conflicts (of the scale of the siting of a regional hazardous 
waste facility). The authors conclude that approximately 90% of the cases where 
· mediators. do become involved never reach an agreement. 
However, these stuqies give an account of mediation until 1984 only. The author 
has had difficulty in obtaining more up-to-date studies from which to make a 
contemporary assessment of mediation's success. Gammanand McCreary 
(Lecturer, Department of Landscape Architecture, University of California, 
pers. comm.) advise that as mediation practice has improved so have the number 
of successes. 
McCreary (1989) documents a recent successful mediation effort in which he was 
the principal mediator. The outcome was a negotiated single. text of the N ew York 
Academy of Sciences New York Bight Initiative. The policy issue was the 
management of polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) in the HudsonlRaritan Estuary 
and the New York Bight system. The consensus approach "does not necessarily 
· represent the 'first choice' of each participant. Instead, it represents a synthesis that 
each important interest can 'live with'" (McCreary, 1988, p.1). 
Gail Bingham has recently been involved in negotiating the United States national 
wetlands policy under the auspices of the Conservation Foundation (Gamman and 
McCreary, pers. comm.). 
4.3 Mediation outcomes 
. , 
'Success'to date in mediating environmental disputes has be~n varied. Reaching 
agreement is a preliminary measure of success. A more important measure is 
whether an agreement reached by the parties is fully implemented (Bingham, 
1984, pp.69-72). If anyone who might be' able to undermine implementation is not 
present during negotiations, the agreement can fail. 
A further measure of 'success' (Bingham, 1984, pp.69-72) can be simply to improve 
communications between the parties. Mediation "seeks to educate disputants about . 
· each other's perceptions and concerns. This can significantly improve relationships 
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between disputants even where no agreement is reached" (Ministry for the· . 
Environment, 1988b, p.6). 
Bingham delineated three categories of objectives set by the parties involved in the 
cases she reviewed. The categories were - to .. reach a decision, to agree on 
recommendations to a decision-making body not directly represented inthe dispute 
resolution process, and to improve communications. One measure of success was 
whether or not they had met their objectives. 
Table 4.1 gives a distribution of these cases by objective set (by· the parties). 
Table 4.1· Distribution of environmental dispute resolution cases, by objective. 
Objective 
All caSes To reach·a To agree on To improve 
decision recommendations wmmunications 
Site-specific cases 115 64 35 16 
POliCy cases 46 4 29 13 
Total cases 161 ·68 64 29 
Source: Bingham, 1986, p.8 
In 29 of the total cases, the parties'· pfincipal objective was to improve 
communications. In the remaining 132 cases, the parties' objective was to reach 
some form of agreement with one another. 
Agreements were reached in 78% of the 132 cases (Bingham, 1986,p.xXi). Bingham 
found little difference between the· ability of parties involved in policy and site-
specific disputes when· the objective had been to reach some sort of agreement with 
each other. This was· achieved in 79% (99) of the site specific cases and 76% (33) 
of the policy level negotiations (Ibid.). 
However, she did find that when all parties that had the authority to make and to 
implement decisions (in particular the participation of the public agencies with 
decision~making authority in a dispute) were present at the negotiations, agreement 
was reached in 82% of the cases. When the decision-making authority to whom 
recommendations were being made was not present, the parties reached agreement 
73% of ,the time (Ibid., p.104). 
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Reaching agreement is not an absolute measure of success. If agreement has been 
reached voluntarily (assuming the parties entered mediation voluntarily), then there 
is a greater chance that it will be successfully implemented. Talbot (1983, p.xiv) 
agrees that implementation is an important test ofa mediation effort. He does 
concede, however, that the process itself can offer valuable rewards. Buckle and 
Thomas-Buckle (1986, p.55) also argue that success can be evaluated against the 
process and not just the· outcome. 
In practice there are significant differences in the implementation of decisions 
reached between· policy level dialogues and site-specific ·cases. "For site-specific 
disputes, of those cases in which agreements were reached and implementation 
results are known, the agreements were fully implemented in 80 percent of the 
cases, partially implemented in ·13 percent, and not implemented in 7 percent ... Of 
the policy-level cases in which agreements were reached and implementation results .. 
are known, agreements were fully implemented in 41 percent of the cases studied, 
partially implemented in 18 percent, and not implemented in 41 percent" 
(Bingham, p.xxii). . 
Environmental policy issues often affect larger proportions of the population· than 
do site-specific disputes. The key parties active at either the national level or 
regional level may be representative of the diverse interests concerned about the 
issues but are not representatives for specific interested parties. (Ibid., p.79). 
Implementation of policy disputes has relied on the ability of the participants to gain 
the broad support of the wider community, and their ability to bring new policy 
options to the attention of those making policy decisions. Representation of the 
decision~making authority also seems to affect the Ilkelihood of success in 
implementing agreements (Ibid., p.124). 
Of the six: cases reviewed by Talbot, an agreement that was subsequently 
implemented was reached in three. Talbot ranked one as successful within the 
specific objectives of the mediation effort; others might argue that the process was 
flawed in that environmental groups that had been excluded were able to 
significantly delay implemen~ation. The remaining two did· not lead . to the 
anticipated or agreed-to results (Talbot, 1983, pp.95-96). 
Buckle and Thomas-Buckle (1986) focus on the lessons that can be learned from 
what they refer to as "failed" site-specific mediation efforts. It should be. noted that 
the authors had only studied four cases in· depth, and pointed out the difficulties 
they had in standardising their survey methodology (Ibid.,p.59). Of the 81, only 
three were brought· to an agreement that was implemented or at least remained 
stable. Table 4.2 illustrates the ~fate' of all the cases in question. 
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Table 4.2 Outcomes· of 81 cases of environmental conflict: the mediators' view. 
At least one party rejected mediation after first ~nquiry 57 
All parties considered mediation 24 
Mediation rejected at first joint meeting 
Failed after extensive mediatiQn 
Brought to agreement but are regarded as unstable 
Brought to agreement and iniplemented or stable 
Source: Adapted from Buckle and Thomas-Buckle, 
1986, p.61 
81 
16 
2 
3 
.2 
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The analysis above can be criticised from the point of view that if mediation was not 
even attempted it cannot be said to have failed. Of the eight cases that entered 
mediation, three achieved either a· stable agreement or actual implementation, and 
three reached agreement. 
An important lesson to be learned from the Buckle and Thomas-Buckle study is the 
critical need for· a full pre-negotiation conflict· assessment before disputes are 
brought to mediation. Bingham :(1986, p.91) points out that the relatively high 
success rate in the dispute resolution efforts reviewed in her study can be attributed 
to th~ fact that the mediators conducted dispute assessments as a first step in 
helping the parties concerned decide whether mediation might be appropriate. 
They 'screen out' disputes that appear to have little chance of being resolved on the 
basis of criteria to be discussed in Section 5.2. 
Buckle and Thomas-Buckle stressed that reaching agreement should not be the sole 
indicator of 'success' but rather that "environmental mediation ought to be focused 
more on process than ()noutcomes". Bingham (1986, p.xxi) also supports this view. 
Participants in her study reported that the. process itself was valuable in gaining 
insights into their opposition's point of view, and that more open lines of 
communication had been developed .. It was interesting to note that in Bingham' 
study nearly 25% of cases had improving communication as their prime objective. 
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4.3.1 DisMes .involving cultural values 
Sullivan (1984,pp.9-15), Talbot (1983) and Amy (1983) outline two disputes 
involving cultural values of two different Indian tribes. Appendix II briefly describes 
the disputes. The one involving the Northern Cheyenne tribe was successfully 
settled; the other involving the Lummi tribe reached agreement but two years later 
had not been implemented. 
Bingham (1986, p.102) refers to site-specific disputes involving Indian tribes and 
others. A success rate of 100% (six cases) was achieved in reaching agreements 
between government agencies and Indian tribes. She was unable to report on the. 
outcome of two other disputes, one involving government agencies, Indian tribes and 
private landowners, the other involving two or more Indian tribes because of the 
need to preserve confidentiaJity. 
Bingham (Ibid.,· p.222) gives a brief outline of cases involving the Papago Indians 
and Tucson Water Rights, and (Ibid., p.226) fishing rights for the Red Cliff Band 
of Chippewa Indian Tribe. The respective recommendation and decision were 
successfully implemented. 
4.3.2 Scientific and technical disputes 
Numerous cases involving scientific and technical disputes have been successfully 
mediated. These include the Brown Paper Co. case (Bacow and Wheeler, 
1984, p.57), the George Banks case (Bingham~ 1986, p;81) and the Brayton Point 
Coal Conversion case (Susskind et· aI., 1983, p.122) amongst others. . Further 
research would be required to investigate whether mediation would be a more 
appropriate approach than t~e judicial one for resolving disputes of this kind. 
4.4 Summary 
A brief examination of mediation practice in North America has given some insights 
into the kinds of conflict that could be resolved using this approach. Disputes 
involving land u~e, natural resource management. and use of public lands, water 
resources, energy, air quality and toxic substances have been successfullymedi~ted. 
Success can be measured in a number of ways:· reaching agreement per se or 
agreeing to make a recommendation to a decision authority,· or whether an 
agreement IS actually implemented, or simply to improve communications~ Success 
can also be evaluated in terms of process and not just of outcomes. 
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The three studies carried out by Bingham, Talbot and Buckle and· Thomas-Buckle 
covered significantly more site-specific disputes than policy dialogues. Bingham 
concluded that there was little difference between parties to policy and site-specific 
disputes in their success at reaching agreement. Reaching agreement was facilitated 
if those with decision-making authority were present. 
Success in the implementation of policy agreements did not appear to be as good 
as that for site-specific disputes during the period to 1984. However, public policy 
disputes have only recently been mediated and are more complicated than site-
specific disputes. They also take longer to reach agreement. 
Pre-assessments by a m~diator may strongly influence this state of affairs. The role 
of the mediator is extremely important in helping the parties decide whether 
mediation is the approach they wish to adopt for their particular dispute. Such 
screening is intended to avoid wasting valuable time and financial resources. If 
parties are holding non..:negotiable positions mediation would not be chosen, 
Disputes over cultural values all. exhibited success in reaching agreement. 
Implementation of the final· agreement did not occur in all cases. One that was no! 
successfully resolved had problems gaining funding for aspects of implementation 
of the agreement. Factors involved. in the implementation of disputes involving. 
cultural values need to be carefully examined in order to achieve successful 
resolution. 
Scientific and technical disputes have been successfully mediated. However, more 
.. research is needed in this area. 
This chapter has looked at the kinds of disputes (in general terms) that reach 
mediation and that are successfully resolved. The next chapter will examine the 
circumstances that affect a party's decision to choose litigation or mediation and the 
criteria that would be considered when making that choice. 
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CHAPTER S 
Litigation or mediation? 
S.l Circumstances surrounding a dispute 
"The motivation· to find alternatives to traditional dispute resolution processes for 
controversial environmental issues has come principally from the discontent of the 
parties with certain aspects of traditional adversarial processes. When decisions in 
a dispute are seen as choices between winners and losers or when decisions are 
based on narrow procedural grounds, the interests of one, and sometimesl;lll, of the 
parties to the dispute often remain unsatisfied" (Bingham, 1986, p.2). 
The decision to choos.e mediation rather the adversarial approach to resolve conflict 
depends on the circumstances of the dispute and what each party hopes to achieve. 
It is "affected by applicable laws arid regulations, by the experiences and resources 
of the parties, (and) by those parties' calculations of how well their interests will be 
served using different dispute resolution approaches" (Huser, 1983,p.3) and by an 
evaluation of the possible consequences of going to the bargaining table (Bacow and 
Wheeler, 1984, pA2). . 
Laws regarding participation will be an important component in the decision to 
litigate or mediate: If a party or parties do not have 'standing' rights at formal 
hearings they may feel the only way they can influence the decision-making process 
is to opt for mediation. The Resource Management Act makes provisiQn for any 
person to be heard at a resource consent application hearing, and also for the 
applicant or consent holder and any person who made a submission at the consent 
hearing stage to beheard at an appeal. . 
Ifa party has had no prior experience of participation in a voluntary dispute 
resolution process it may find it difficult to evaluate its likelihood of success or 
failure. It may not know what factors are· important. ·The initiating party may have 
little or no communication with other affected parties and therefore experience 
difficulty in determining their willingness to participate. In this case the party may 
contact a . mediator to learn about different dispute resolution options 
(Bingham, p.91). 
For those parties with meagre financial resources mediation might be their only 
realistic opportunity to have some influence in the dispute. The inability to sustain 
lawyers' fees for lengthy court appeals,plus the fe'ar that they will be liable for costs 
at the end of the process means that small citizen and environmental groups may 
agree to mediation. Some groups may form temporary coalitions with others having 
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. similar interests in order to rationalise -demands on both people and time. The 
prospect of legal aid for environmental groups (Legal Services Act, 1991) could act 
as a disincentive to enter into mediation. The question of funding mediation in New 
Zealand has yet to be addressed. 
Preference for litigation or mediation will also. depend on how well the party~s 
interests will be served by the approach. For local government organisations who 
have an on-going relationship with their constituents it may be important to 
maintain and improve communications with other parties to the dispute (Ibid., p.48). 
Mediation could well be the preferred approach. 
" Groups seeking scientific and technical data may initially opt for mediation as a 
_ 'fi~hing expedition' and then -use the information gained at a subsequent court 
<. -, hearing (Ministry for the Environment, 1988b, p.31) .. On the other ·hand, mediation 
can provide an opportunity for technical expeI'ts to meet to compile a single set of 
data on what is known and what is not known about a particular resource 
(Ibid., p.50). 
Environmental groups may prefer m~diation to litigation on the grounds that they 
may be able to have more influence on an environmental impact report, "for 
example, than they coul~ do if they chose litigation. The consensus approach of 
mediation can produce an all':gain outcome where no one party emerges as 'winner' .. 
However, Cormick (1987, p.308) suggests that citizen and environ~ental 
organisations who oppose proposed projects see the courts as a critical line of 
defence. 
. Others may wish to establish a legal precedent and therefore opt for litigation. 
Alternatively, some may choose mediation in the belief that novel solutions can be 
sought but that they -will not necessarily act as a precedent in future disputes. 
5.2 Critical elements 
The circumstances outlined above give some idea of when a party may choose to 
litigate or to mediate. However, there are a number of. other factors that will 
influence this decision. The mediator would consider these when conducting an 
assessment of the dispute to determine in advance the potential of mediation for 
-resolving the issues under dispute. 
Although there are few factors that are absolute preconditions for success, Bingham 
(1986, pp~91-126) isolates a number -of elements that appear to increase the 
likelih~od of success in mediating environmental and resource management conflict. 
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These factorscah be grouped into party-related factors, process- and context-related 
factors, and substance-related factors. 
Party-related factors include identification and involvement of all affected interests, 
the number of parties involved, types of parties involved, and the direct involvement 
of decision makers, including public agencies. 
Process- and context-related factors include· agreement on procedural issues, 
presence of a· deadline, possession of sufficient incehtives to enter mediation, the 
ability to satisfy each party's underlying interests, whether the dispute was in 
litigatiori, the maintenance of good representative-constituency relationships,and the 
. will to negotiate in good faith. 
Substance-related factors Include the issues in dispute, agreement on the scope of 
issues, and agreement on the 'facts'. 
5.21 Party-related factors 
5.2.1.1 Identification of parties 
Bacowand Wheeler (1984, p.19) raise the question of who should be included in 
the negotiations. As alternative dispute resolution pr-ocess~s usually operate on an 
ad hoc basis, there are no firm rules governing who can participate. . 
Successful implementation of a final agreement depends in large part upon whether 
all parties likely to be affected by the agreement were present during the 
negotiations. Ev~n if an agreement is reached; it may not· address the concerns of 
unrepresented groups who may subsequently take action to block or undermine 
implementation of the agreement (Bingham, 1986,p.xx). The. mediator must 
therefore try to include all those who might be able to thwart any implementation 
efforts once an !:lgreement has been reached~ In Chapter 4.3 the importance of 
having the decision-making authority present at negotiations was highlighted. 
At the same time, however, the mediator must be aware of the difficulties inherent 
in large disputes with a large. number of parties seeking participation. Early 
involvement of all parties can result in attempts to address an overwhelmingly great 
number of issues simultaneously. Techniques such as segmentation, which break the 
process into several subsets of J)egotiations, present. both advantages and 
disadvantages to tl].e parties involved (Susskind etaZ., 1983, pp.207-208). 
Bingham (1986, p.77) observed th!:lt it was relatively straightforward to identify 
affected parties in site-specific disputes in comparison to policy disputes. 
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5.2.1.2 Representation 
Fiss (1984, pp.1078-1082) raises the question of authoritative consent. He points 
out that while some organisations have formal procedures for identifying persons 
. who are authorised to speak on their behalf, these procedures' are not perfect. 
Personal. conflicts of interest can underm.ine such procedures. . The procedures for 
generating authoritative consent in governmental agencies may be cruder than those 
operating in the corporate context. 'Groups' may have a public identity but may lack 
any formal organisational structure and therefore have no procedures for generating 
authoritative consent. 
Further, if those party to the final agreement are not truly representative of groups 
likely to be affected by any decision then implementation can be undermined by 
disenchanted individuals. 
In his perspective on the effect Maori values are having within the current approvals 
process, Rickard, (1989, pp.23-25) comments on difficulties he has encountered in 
ascertaining appropriate representation of Maori interests in hearings and appeals. 
He believes that a person engaging in negotiations may not have the authority to 
do so. Rickard also perceives a reluctance to facilitate discovery of the correct 
representation. 
Professor J. Ritchie, University of Waikato, refers to the principle of rang at ira taka: 
the hierarchical organisation of authority in Maori society (1986, p.30). He points 
out the need to deal with whanau,a hapu, an iwi, and a waka to establish the 
appropriate representation. According to Gray (pers. comm.); the lwi Transition 
Agency will assist in clarifying and defining issues of rangatirataka .. 
Mernitz (1980, p.159) recommends that the mediator should give particular 
consideration to the institutional responsibilities and constraints on representative 
negotiators. "Because of their employers, certain officials may be reluctant to 
comment, to make commitments, or . to jeopardize future review responsibilities. 
Other officials may be required to comment,· make recommendations, or promote 
policies in keeping with statutory or· administrative responsibilities. Still other 
persons, often from advocate groupge~ may encourage technical and policy decisions 
which will further their interests and also influence the general public." 
Bingham (1986, p.79) refers to the difficulty in determining who can represent the 
various interests. in a policy dialogue. Key parties active at either the national or 
regional level can change as issues are redefined'and as coalitions are built. In most 
of the policy dialogues included in Bingham's study "participants were representative 
of the diverse interests concerned about the issues but were not r~presentatives for 
specific companies,. public int~rest groups, or other interested parties. Because of 
this characteristic, policy dialogues are much.less likely to produce formal decisions 
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and are more apt to result in recommendations for action or simply to discuss the 
iss"!les" . 
5.2.1.3 Number and types of parties involved 
Bingham (1986, p.99) found no evidence among the cases she studied that reaching , 
an agreement is affected by the number of parties involved in the dispute. The 
average number of parties in the cases she studied was just over four, with a range 
of between two and'40-plus. She does note, however, that some dispute resolution 
experts recom~end limiting mediation attempts to cases involving 15 or fewer " 
p~rties. 
Bingham found that the average number of parties for cases in which the parties 
failed to reachan agreement waS lower than the average number of parties in cases 
in which agreements were reached. She suggests, however, preliminary assessment 
may have eliminated cases where 'a 'large number of parties may have reduced'the 
likelihood of success. ' 
, A, diverse range of parties has participated in environmental dispute resolution 
efforts; they include "mediated negotiations between government agencies and local 
citizens or property owners; between government agencies, pri"ate companies, and 
local citizens; between government agencies, environmental groups, and local 
citizens; between government agencies and private corporations; and between 
government agencies and Indian tribes" (Ibid., p.102). Although the' reasons are 
, unclear, the success rates for reaching agreements differ by the combination of types 
of parties. The combinations cited here have tended to reach agreement between 
86 and 100% of the time. (Bingham's (Ibid., p.101) analysis is based on small 
numbers in each category; she is uncertain whether ,the differences would hold with 
larger numbers in each category.) . 
According to B.ingham (Ibid., p.xxiv) "(t)he most significant, measurable factor in 
, the likelihood of'success in implementing agreements appears to be whether those 
with the authority to implement the decision participated directly in the process". 
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5.22 Process- and context~re1ated factors 
5.2.2.1 Incentives 
"The willingness of all parties to a dispute to participate is a major 
factor in the success of a voluntary dispute resolution process,if one 
expects an agreement reached to be both fair and stable. But the parties 
are unlikely to participate, let alone agree to a settlement, if they can 
, achieve more of what they want in another way . ... Mediators generally 
do not convene negotiations unless the parties are at least somewhat 
interested in attempting to resolve the dispute" (Bingham, 1986, p.xxiii). 
Parties are unlikely to negotiate unless they perceive that it is in their best interests 
to do so. They must also perceive benefits to themselves to ratify a possible 
settlement, to continue negotiating or to leave the bargaining table part way through 
negotiations. They may also have to choose whether to breach an agreement in 
whole or in part, after settlement -has been reached (Bacow and 
Wheeler, 1984, p.42). If they are confident of, victory in a lawsuit, there is little 
incentive to consider mediation or negotiation. 
Disputes are settled when people perceive that the cost of continuing the dispute 
exceeds the cost of settlement (/bid., p.52). Developers who are likely to incur 
heavy financial losses if a project is halted after it has started may see mediation as 
a preferable option (Sullivan, 1984, p.15, pA9; Bingham, 1986, pp.35-36). A party 
may be tempted to seek mediation if it believes it could reduce delays that might 
occur while waiting to gain a court hearing. 
Vern Huser (1983, p.26), an experienced United States mediator, suggests that if 
strong citizen activist groups gain power by being involved in a'conflict they may:not 
want to settle that conflict. Settlement may see an erosion of their power base; this 
is not in their best interest and they do not want to participate. 
Johnston (1989, p.ll) cites findings of two separate authors (Millhauser, 1987; 
Moore, 1986) on the reluctance 'of parties to seek an alternative dispute resolution 
approach. "Clients, they claim, are' resistant because of suspicions of the motives 
of the other side, doubts that a side could so misread the facts of this dispute could 
be trusted in such a process (sic), strong feelings of righteousness and fear of the 
suggested alternatives". This statement does not refer specifically to environmental 
mediation but nonetheless could still apply in such circumstances. 
5.2.2.2· Context of power 
According to Cormick (cited in Amy, 1983, p.358) the key element in a successful 
mediation effort is the 'conteXt of power' in which negotiations take place. If the 
parties in a dispute are unable to act unilaterally in what they perceive to be their' 
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best interests they may be willing to enter the negotiation-mediation process. 'Good 
faith' mediation is likely to occur if the parties involved have some relative ability 
to exercise 'sanctions over one another. 
All parties must have sufficient power to influence the action of each other party. 
Cormick (1987, p.311) points out that Government organisations and private 
corporations are, endowed with power and influence by the' existing 
political/economic system. Citizen and environm~ntal groups, on the other hand, 
,generally have to develop their power resources on a situation~by-situation basis. 
Cormi~k suggests that it may be necessary to develop "less transitory" sources of 
influence if mediation is to become more broadly and regularly applied. 
Th~ balance of power between parties is a 'powerful' determinant in choosing 
whether to mediate. Actual or threatened litigation can be the source of power and 
influence that brings parties to mediation (Cormick, 1987, p.308). 
The leverage that individual parties can have in negotiation may depend on the 
context of substantive and procedural law. The absence of established principles 
can significantly reduce the leverage available to one or more parties' (Ministry for 
the Environment, 1988b, p.lO). 
Burgess (1983, p.205) proposes that mediation cannot redistribute power .. She 
suggests that if it seems likely a party will lose power they will certainly not 
partiCipate. Chart (Senior Lecturer, Law Department, University of Canterbury, 
pers. comm.), however, argues that the power balance is never static, and that it can 
be changed by the presence of a mediator. 
In the Montana Power and Northern Cheyenne case referred to in Section 4.3.1, 
Sullivan (1984, p.12) draws attention to the fact that the need to comply with a new 
federal regulatory programme altered the perceived ability of the two main parties 
to achieve their goals. 
Disparities in resources between parties can influence the final agreement. Poorer 
parties may be disadvantaged in the bargaining process if they are less able to 
acquire and analyse appropriate information (Fiss, p.1076). The ability to generate 
a sufficient information base depends on "the availability of adequate fundirig; 
access to legal and technical expertise, familiaiity with the process itself, and 
knowledge of the rights and remedies afforded by both the process and applicable 
legislation" (Jeffery, 1988, p.247). 
Proponents of the judicial approach to conflict resolution argue that a: judge can 
employ measures to reduce the impact of distributional inequalities between parties. 
Supplementary questions can be asked, witnesses called, and third parties can be 
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invited toparticipat:e (Fiss, 1984, pp. 101'7-1078). (See also Section 149 of the 
Town and CountryPlap.ning Act 1977.) 
5.2.2.3 Ability to satisfy each party's underlying interests 
"The basic problem in a negotiation lies not in conflicting positions, but 
in~ the. conflict between each side's needs, desires, concerns, and fears ... 
Such desires and concerns are interests. Interests' motivate people; they 
are the silent movers behind the hubbub of positions'~ (Fisher and _ 
Ury, 1981, p.42). 
Fisher and Ury (Ibid., pp.41-57) advocate afocus on interests not positions. They 
claim that arguing over positions produces unwise agreements, endangers ongoing 
relationships and is worse when there are many parties at the negotiating table 
(Ibid., pp.5-7). Their approach is of enormous help in resolving disputes in that an 
ability and willingness of parties to identify the interests that underlie each other's 
positions can facilitate a search for new alternatives that satisfy .~hose interests 
(Bingham, 1986, p.109). 
When a mediator is able to determine the underlying objectives or interests in the 
dispute~ it may be found that they are sufficiently different that they are not 
. mutually exclusive. There are cases, however, where the parties' underlying interests 
are mutually exclusive; they are unable to find common ground regardless of their 
skill in n~gotiating with one another or the p:resence of a mediator (Ibid., p.xxiii). 
The parties may be unwilling to compromise sufficiently to reach an accord, or they 
are unable to develop alte.rnatives that may satisfy each other's needs (Ibid., p.ll0). 
'~ decision not to participate in a dispute resolution process often is an 
important protection for a party when the process either does not include 
the issues of importance to that party or when the way the process is 
designed is not in its best interests" (Ibid., p.70) .. 
5.2.2.4 Whether the dispute was in litigation 
Bingham (1986, p.113) found that the cases (site-specific) in which a lawsuit had 
been filed were resolved less frequently than those where no lawsuit had been filed. 
However, she .points out that over 90% of all environmental lawsuits are settled. 
before the case goes to trial. Lawsuits can clarify or focus the issues. They can also 
. "raise the stakes sufficiently that parties who had beenteluctant to negotiate 
previously may be more willing to take their opponents seriously" (Ibid.). 
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, 5.2.3 Substance-related factors , 
5.2.3.1 " Crystallisation of issues 
Information is of crucial importance in resolving environmental and resource 
management conflict. 'Who injects it into the process, how much is injected and at 
what stage, affects the way in which the issues are viewed. As we are never in a 
state of perfect information we have to make decisions based on the information 
that is available to us. Expert opinion supporting each party's stance is very likely 
to be conflicting; a ,mediator may have to decide therefore whether there needs to 
be agreement on the relevance of facts of the 'dispute before negotiation can 
commence or at least agreement on the scope of the issues to be negotiated 
(BinghaJ!l, 1986, p.117). 
BinghaIJ? (1986: p.117) concluded that, at least in site-specific disputes, the kind of 
issues involved had little effect on the likelihood of a dispute being resolved. 
However, the small sample size in some categories means those results were 
inconclusive. ,She goes on to suggest that the influence of the kind' of issue on 
potential success would be linked to other factors such as whether the particular 
dispute has precedent-setting implications. 
Although it is not always easy to discover the key issues that need to be resolved to 
satisfy all the parties in a site-specific dispute, it is a relatively straightforward task' 
when compared with policy disputes (Bingham, 1986~ p.77). 
5.2.3.2 Agreement on scope of issues , 
When the mediation process is being designed, it must take account 'of whether all 
parties have reached general agreement on the scope of the issues to be addressed. 
Even if an issue is an issue for only one of the parties, it needs to be discussed 
(Huser, 1983, p.29). However, mediators are not in agreement as to whether the 
scope of issues should oe addressed before or during face-to-face negotiations 
(Bingham, 1986, p.118). 
Bingham (Ibid.) was unable to measure the extent to which agreement on the scope 
of issues was a significant factor in the success of the cases she studied. The 
difficulty could be attributed to a matter of timing in some' cases, a matter of degree 
in others, and a matter of perception in others. , 
In his assessment of the effects of Maori vaiues in the planning process Rickard, 
(1989, p.24) identified the problem of group versus' individual concerns. An 
individual objector may raise spiritual, or other Maori concerns that may not 
represent the values that are more widely held. Maori protocol could rest'rain an iwi 
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· from publicly challenging an individual's viewpoint. Such a situation has. the 
potential to undermine an attempt to reach a genuine agreement .. 
5.2.3.3 Agreement on the facts 
The term 'facts' as suggested by Bingham is a misnomer in the. context of our 
discussion. The issue is the interpretation of the facts of the case rather than 
debate over the facts themselves. Some Maori people living in the vicinity of a 
proposed development site, for example, may not hold traditional values and may 
advise enquirers that there are no particular concerns. There may be a clear split 
between local people as to whether cultural values are likely to be affected 
(Rickard, 1989, p.24). 
· People. disagree about the potential impacts of proposed projects. They have 
different attitudes towards risk and uncertainty. There may be no agreement over . 
the accuracy or relevance of the facts presented, nor over how the data Should be 
weighed. During the dispute assessment process mediators look for such problems 
and build opportunities for information exchange or joint fact-finding into the 
agenda before negotiations begin (Bingham, 1986, p.120). 
Bingham (Ibid.) refers to a problem mediators face when designing a dispute 
resolution process to deal with complex technical information. Parties rarely have 
equal resources for obtaining the data and analysis needed to negotiate effectively. 
If this difficulty is not overcome, the chances of success are limited. 
5.3 Summary 
The circumstances surrounding a dispute, the application of laws and regulations, 
the experience of the parties concerned, their resources, and how well their interests 
· will' be served by the particular approach affects' the decision to litigate or mediate. 
In addition to theSe issues, a number of important factors have to be taken' into 
account by a mediator when advising a party whether or not to proceed with 
mediation .. These elements can be grouped into party-related factors, process- and 
context-related factors, and substance-:related factors. Crucial to the mediation 
process is the identification- of all . affected parties, appropriate representation, 
incentives to mediate, and the existing power balance. The number of parties 
involved does not appear to influence success," although mediators may have 
screened out dispute~ with a large number of potential participants. The types of 
parties present do not appear to influence success. 
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Substance-related factors are also important. When designing a process fs2.r a . 
particular dispute, the mediator encourages parties to identify the issues that ~re 
important to them, as well as attempting- to gainagteement on the scope of issues 
and on issues relating to the facts of the case. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Conclusion and recommendations 
6.1' , Summary 
The purpose of this study was to identify the circumstances under which resource 
management problems might be more appropriately resolved by mediation than by 
judicial determination. It was suggested at the outset of this work that there are, 
aspects of. the adversarial process that are not always conducive to resolving 
environmental' conflict. The following is a summary of how, this proposition was 
examined and the findings that emerged. . 
Environmental conflict derives from a change in attitudes towards the impacts of 
development on, the environment, a resurgence in' the demands of Maori people 
that their rights as specified by the Treaty ofWaitangi be recognised, as well as 
from increasing pressure upon finite, resources. People'differ in'their attitudes 
towards risk and uncertainty. There is also disagreement as to the weights that 
should be placed on particular policies and values, the <iistribution ,of costs and 
benefits of development, and the use of fixed, resources. 
Disputes that come before the courts can be categorised within three broad classes 
of environmental issues: general primary issues that involve fundamental resource 
management decisions of a national policy nature; particular primary issues that are 
concer~ed with the potential impacts of development at the site-specific level, and 
seconqary issues that arise indirectly from a proposed activity. 
T~e judicial apprQach, to .conflict resolution, was, examined. Some positive aspects' 
of the Planning Tribunal system such as obtaining evidence under oath and the 
p.ublic nature of the process were highlighted., However, this study was more 
, concerned with potential limitations of the approach. Underlying concerns of the 
parties may not be relevant in the legal process. The adversarial approach 
encourages parties to focus on positions and not on more fundamental concerns~ 
, The approach tends to produce, win/lose . outcomes; Third-party interests may not 
be represented in proceedings. The judiciary argue that it is not their role t6 
resolve national policy questions involving general primary issues. There is some 
debate on whether the courts are the most appropriate forum for resolving scientific 
and technical disputes. ' " ,. 
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Provision has been -made in the Resource_ Management Act for alternative dispute 
resolution approaches such as mediation. The mediation approach is sufficiently 
flexible'to be used as a supplement or adjunct to the existing resol:1rce consent 
hearing and appeal-process. 
The potential benefits and limitations of mediation were investigated to see whether 
-it can address the possilJlelimitations of the judicial approach. 
A major benefit is that in such a voluntary process where the parties set the agenda 
themselves, the substantive underlying concerns can be identified and -debated. 
When parties focus on interests and not positions they can be more flexible in their 
-search for options. They may need to reframe the issues before they can proceed 
-with .negotiations .. Through a process of consensus -building and joint problem 
solving parties may be able to come to an agreement that is mutually acceptable. 
This can result in an 'all-gain' situation where there are no clear winners and losers . 
. When the parties have reached an agreement .that is 'theirs' they are less likely to 
undermine its implementation and to resort to court action. 
Because the mediation approach is based on consensus decisionm~kingit is not -
appropriate for situations involving deeply held, non-negotiable values positions. 
Mediation does not resolve the basic differences that separate parties ih conflict. 
_The question of third party and community rights is of crucial importance. If they 
are ignored in the mediation process mediated solutions that are not 
. environmentally suitable or acceptable can result. 
Three studies of mediation practice were reviewed. Mediation has been used in 
cases involving land' use, natural resource management and use -of public lands, 
water resources, energy, air quality, and toxics. Success can be defined in a number 
of ways: reach,ing agreement, -implementing - an - agn!ement, -.. improving 
communication, or in the process itself. . The most important factor in the 
implementation of site-specific disputes is the direct involvement of the decision 
makers themselves. Greater success was· achieved in media~ing site-specific disputes 
than policy dialogues. It should be noted, however, that these studies covered 
mediation practice to 1984. As experience has increased more success has been 
achieved in the. mediation of national policy issues. 
Disputes involving cultural values have been successfully mediated, particularly those 
between Government agencies and Indian tribes (Appendix 2). A full and proper 
examination of scientific and technical disputes was:not undertaken; further research 
needs to be carried out in this area to see whether mediation might' offer a more 
appropriate approach than the. Judicial one. 
e • '" • 
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, Finally, an examination was mape ,of the variables that determine a party's choice 
,as to litigation or mediation. ' It was found that a decision to litigate or mediate 
depends ion, the particular circumstances surroundirig a dispute. These include the 
app~icable laws and regulations, the experiences and resources of the parties, as well 
as ,the parties' calculations ot how well their int~rests would be served using a 
particular approach and an evaluation of the p~ssible implications of going to the 
bargaining table. 
Factors that may increase or decrease the likelihood of Success include party-related 
factors, process- and context-related factors, and substance-related factors. Factors 
crucial to the mediation process were identification of all affected parties, 
appropriate representation, incentives to mediat¢, and the existing power balance. 
, Inherent difficuJAies with policy disputes is theidentification of all parties that should 
participate and how represe~tation of specific interests can be achieved. ,These 
difficulties could also occur in site-specific disputes involving Maori cultural and 
spiritual values. Identification of affected parties can be difficult for Pakeha who are 
unfamiliar with t,he Maori hierarchy of authority. ' 
. . . . . 
The number of parties involved did not appear to influence success, although 
,mediators may have screened out disputes with a large number of potential 
participants., The types of parties present do 'not appear to influence succeSs in a 
m~jor way. Cases where 'a lawsuit had been filed were ~esolved less frequently'than 
those where no lawsuit had been filed. 
Substance-related factors are very important. When designing a process for a 
particular dispute, the mediator encourages parties to identify the issues that are 
. important to them, as well as attempting to gain agreement on the scope of issues 
and on issues surrounding the facts of the case. 
6.2 " Circumstances' when mediation may be more appropriate than judicial 
determination 
"No firm ,guidelines exist for. types of cases referred to private dispute i~solutio~ 
systems. ' No empirical evidence' suggests that any single 'type of case is 
inappropriate .... As a voluntary process:, if the parties agree, any case can go t,o a 
private system" (Johnston, 1989,p.6). The fad that underlying substantive 'concerns 
can be taken into account suggests that in some circumstances mediation might be ' 
preferred to judicial determination. 
However, the conclusion re~ched in this study iS,that it is not possible nor indeed' 
proper to attempt to identify a particular set of circumstances when environmental 
mediation might be more appropriate at resolving resource 'management problems 
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. than judicial determination. Such a definitive statement would be a short-sighted 
- value judgement~, ' 
"The usefulness of mediation may be influenced more by the characteristics of 'a 
particular conflict at a particular time than on the 'category' of the case" (Ministry 
for the Environment, 1988b, p.10). No one process is likely to be successful in all 
situations (Bingham, 1986, p2). The decision to litigate or mediate is affected by 
the applicable laws and regulations, the experience of parties with alternative 
dispute resolution approaches, the resources of the . parties, and how well their 
respective interests will be served by the ,approach in question. It also depends on 
party-, process- and substance-related factors referred to above. 
Attitudes towards the process itself by parties and by lawyers, for example, will 
influence the choice, as will perceptions of whether the process' se1'ves to empower 
particula:r groups in the community or not. . 
It is possible though to make some general observations based on documented past -
practice as to the -general characteristics of disputes that might be amenable to 
mediation . 
. Mediation seems to be appropriate for site-:spedfic disputes. They have a relatively 
good track-record for resolution once they get to mediation. Resource managers 
could find this a useful tool at both the regional and local levels. If the criteria 
discussed in Section 5.2 are carefully' weighed up by a trained mediator, these 
disputes have a good ,chance of an 'all-gain' outcome. 
Mediation has -the potential to be appropriate in disputes concerning 'cultural apd 
spiritual values.. Documented case studies indieate a number of successes. The 
approach may also be preferred by Maori people because face-to-face dialogue and 
consensus decision making practised on marae more closely resembles alternative 
dispute resolution approaches than does the judicial approach. It is crucial that the. 
appropriate representation can be ident~:tied within the Maori hierarchy of authority 
otherwise the potential exists for unrepresented groups or individuals to undermine, 
implementation of the agreement. 
Recent experience in the United States offers promise for the resolution of national 
policy issues in resource management through mediation. Such a step could remove 
this problem from the judicial arena .. This option could be added to those suggested 
by Karen Cremin (Ministry for the Environment, 1988c, pp.6-10) in her report to the 
Resource Management Core Group. ,I, 
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6.3 Recommendations 
1. A flexible, case-by-:-case approach to the use' of environmental mediation 
should be adopted at this early· stage. Experiments with more formal 
application of the process in specific issue areas may be a prudent course of 
action. 
2. . Documentation and monitoring of mediation efforts would allow policy and 
procedure to evolve in the light of what is learned from practice. 
3. An investigation is required into the institutionalisation of mediation into 
resource management decision making at the resource consent application 
and appeal stages. 
·4. Research is required on· establishing the role of the neutral mediator an~ 
how that could be funded. A sub-set of this enquiry should be mediator 
. ethics and whether a mediator should be required to represent the interests 
of third parties not represented at negotiations~ 
5. Research is required into a mediation process that is appropriate for New 
. Zealand's cultural environment. 
6. Mediator training needs to be provided. This is crucial for all stages of the 
process but particularly' for pre-assessment of the dispute: 
7. Research nee~s to be carried out on whether mediation might be a more 
appropriate process for resolving scientific and technical disputes . 
. 8. Research would be required into the specific nature of policy disputes as 
they are more complicated than site-specific disputes. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Tasks of the mediator 
Phases' 
Pre negotiation 
Getting started 
Representation 
Drafting protocols and 
agenda setting 
Joint fact finding 
Negotiation 
Inventing options 
Packaging. 
Written agreement 
Binding the parties 
Ratification 
Tasks' 
. Meeting with potential stakeholders to assess their 
interests and describe the consensus-building 
process; handling logistics and convening initial 
meetings; assist groups in initial ca1culatiOI1. of 
. BATNAs (Best alternative to negotiated agreement) 
Caucusing with stakeholders to help choose~ 
spokespeople or team leaders; working with initial 
.' . stakeholders to identify missing groups or strategi~s 
for representing diffuse interests . 
Preparing draft protocols based on past and agenda 
setting experience and the concerns of the parties; 
managing the process of agenda setting 
Helping to draft fact-finding protocols; identifying 
technical raising and administering the funds in a 
resource pool; serving as a repository for 
confidential or proprietary information 
Managing the brainstorming process; suggesting 
potential options for the group to consider; co- . 
ordinating subcommittees to draft options 
Cau~using privately with each gr~up to idelltify and . 
test possible trades; . suggesting possible packages 
Jor the group to consider 
Working with a subcommitee (sic) to produce a 
draft agreement; managing a single-text procedure; 
preparing a preliminary draft of a single text 
Serving as the holder of the bond; approaching' 
. outsiders on behalf of the group; helping to invent 
new ways to bind the parties to their. commitments 
Helping the participants 'sell' the agreement to their 
constituents; ensuring that all representatives hav~ 
. been in touch with their constituents 
53 
Implementation or post negotiation 
Linking informal Working with the parties to invent linkages; 
agreements and formal approaching elected or appointed 'officials on behalf 
deci~ion making . . of the group; . identifying the legal constraints on 
Monitoririg 
. Renegotiation. 
implementation . . 
Serving as the monitor of implementation; 
convening a monitoring group 
Reassembling the participants if subsequent 
disagreements emerge; helping to remind the 
group of its. earlier intentions . 
Source: Susskind a!ld Cruikshank, 1987, pp.142-143 
" (. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Disputes involving cultural values 
Sullivan (1984, pp.9~15) documents a bitter 'conflict between the Montana Power 
Company and the Northern Cheyenne,tribe over a 1972 decision to construct two 
700-megawatt coal-burning plants at Colstrip, Montana. Emissions from the plants 
would have reduced the range that could be seen from the reservation of the 
Northern Cheyenne. Even though the air would have been amongst the cleanest 
in the nation, the tribe believed that part of their heritage as Indians lay in the clean 
air and water of their reservation lands. They were opposed to any.project that 
would lead to environmental deterioration. I~ addition they believed that 
construction would pose a:' threat to traditional tribal values. '. " 
,After years of litigation, representatives of all the parties involved began a series of 
negotiations in 1979. The tribe was able to air concerns over the perceived threats 
to the traditional way of life. Seven months later Montana Power and the Northern' 
Cheyenne's tribal council reached, a comprehensive settlement, part of which" 
included compensation for, the tribe for loss of amenity. 
, P()rtage Island~ located iri Puget Sound near Bellingham, Washington, illustrates an' 
, unsuccessful resolution of a dispute involving cultural values. There had been an, 
ongoing controversy over who should own the island and, how it was to be used. 
The island was originally owned by various'members of the Lummi Indian Tribe and 
was connected to the tribal reservation by a sandbar at low tide. In 1965 the island 
, was sold to the Whatcom County Park Board who wanted to create a public park 
(Amy, 1983, p.347). ' 
In 1970 the Lummi Tribal Council reverse~>its decision and took steps, to prohibit 
non-Indians frolli using the,island. ,There was concern that increased motor traffic 
through the re&ervatibn would be disruptive. There was a fear that boat traffic 
would interfere with fishing nets and shellfish beds used by tribal members around 
the island. (Ibid., p.348). . 
With the prospe~t of prolonged litigation, the Interior Department deCided to 
explore the possibility of a negotiated settlement. Although "the tribe and county 
were locked into a battle of pride, principle, and cultural integrity, neither side was 
convinced, that it wanted a court to decide the future of 'Portage Island" 
(Ibid., pp.57-58). 
After three months of negotiations aided by two mediators' an agreement began to 
emerge. The Park Board was willing to sell the island back to the Lummis on the, 
condition they would agree to let it be used as a park. The Lummis finally agreed, 
with the stipulation that no boat landings or marinas be included in the plan for the' 
park. This would protect their fisheries. The Bureau of Indian Affairs was to 
provide the funds to bur back the island (Amy, 1983, pp.348.:349). 
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· Approximately tWo years after agreement was reached, it had not been . 
implemented. A lack of tribal funds to fulfil paiticular aspects· of the agreement 
may result in the case being referred to litigation (Talbot, 1983, p.96). 
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